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notwithstanding, however, the often-encountered brain in a vat is, to say the least, in a very odd and 
artificial situation. Given what seems to be an essential connection between embodiment and situation, I 
will take the more inclusive and holistic route and view them accordingly. 
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Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition 
Shaun Gallagher 
In this chapter I plan to situate the concept of situated cognition within the 
framework of antecedent philosophical work. My intention, however, is not to 
provide a simple historical guide but to suggest that there are still some untapped 
resources in these past philosophers that may serve to enrich current accounts of 
situated cognition. 
I will include embodied cognition as part of the concept of situated cognition. 
One often encounters these terms used together – embodied cognition and situated 
cognition – and it is clear that situated cognition cannot be disembodied, although 
some authors emphasize one over the other or provide principled distinctions 
between them.1 Philosophical thought experiments notwithstanding, however, the 
often-encountered brain in the vat, is, to say the least, in a very odd and artificial 
situation. Given what seems to be an essential connection between embodiment and 
situation, I will take the more inclusive and holistic route and view them accordingly. 
The large landscape of sources for the concept of situated cognition is 
populated with important psychologists (from Vygotsky to Gibson) and biologists 
(from von Uexküll to Varela), many of whom have had a significant impact on how 
we think of cognition as complexly embodied and situated.2 I think that it is right to 
say that most contemporary philosophers who champion the idea of situated 
cognition have been positively influenced by this work in psychology and 
neurobiology. For the philosophers with whom we will be concerned, however, the 
psychology and biology of their time had less of a positive effect, and in some cases 
defined precisely what these philosophers were reacting against. What is even clearer 
is that these philosophers were reacting against a long philosophical tradition that 
                                                     
1 Clark (1997) provides one of the best analyses of embodied and situated cognition. Anderson (2003), 
for example, provides the following principled distinction:  
In my view, it is the centrality of the physical grounding project that differentiates research in 
embodied cognition from research in situated cognition, although it is obvious that these two 
research programs are complementary and closely related. . . . Although related to and 
continuous with situated cognition, [embodied cognition] takes the physical grounding 
project as its central research focus. This project calls for detailing the myriad ways in which 
cognition depends upon – is grounded in – the physical characteristics, inherited abilities, 
practical activity, and environment of thinking agents. (pp. 92, 126)  
For further discussion of this distinction, see Prinz (this volume). 




simply ignored the importance of body and situation in favor of the isolated mind. 
This tradition included, of course, Descartes, but also Locke, Hume, and Kant, and 
almost every other modern philosopher one can name. To ignore embodiment and 
situation was the overwhelming tendency of the philosophical tradition up to and 
including many twentieth-century philosophers. 
Before the twentieth century it is difficult, though not impossible, to find 
philosophers who could count as proponents of situated cognition. There is, however, 
a long tradition that emphasized practical reason, especially in discussions of ethics 
and politics, and in these discourses the idea of situated reasoning is not absent. One 
could mention here Aristotle’s notion of phronesis (practical wisdom), which is a 
form of knowing or epistemic capacity that is highly dependent on the particular and 
practical (moral) situation in which it must be practiced. In the case of phronesis, one 
does not know in general, or by appeal to a set of rules, so much as one decides case 
by case – with special attention to the details of each case – what one must do. The 
Stoics also regarded the situation, defined in its most determined and concrete terms, 
as an important factor in knowing what one can and cannot do. These traditions, 
however, were not carried over into the realm of theoretical knowledge, or what 
philosophy has considered cognition per se (something closer to mathematics than to 
phronesis), which was most frequently thought to be independent of situation. Even 
moral deliberation was frequently modeled on context-free or mathematical thinking 
(think of Kant’s categorical imperative or Bentham’s utilitarian calculus). There may 
be a number of exceptions to this general view (I think Nietzsche would count as an 
exception, for example),3 but nothing like a fully developed concept of situated 
cognition is to be found prior to the twentieth century. 
In general, then, if the roots of the idea of situated cognition extend back into 
the history of philosophy, they remained undeveloped and well covered by the 
ground from which the Enlightenment grew, not even to be unearthed in all the 
digging for epistemological foundations. But in the twentieth century this idea did 
break the surface, and it started to grow in certain philosophers who were reacting 
critically against the modern philosophies of Descartes, Kant, and numerous others. I 
focus on four such philosophers: Dewey, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and 
Wittgenstein. These are four philosophers among a list that could include many 
others, such as William James, George Herbert Mead, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Aron 
Gurwitsch, Hans Jonas, Hubert Dreyfus, or more recently, Andy Clark, Mark 
                                                     
3 If I say, “The mind thinks,” Nietzsche (1967) responds in the following way:  
If I say ‘lightning flashes,’ I have posited the flash once as an activity and a second time as a 
subject, and thus added to the event a being that is not one with the event but is rather fixed, 
is, and does not ‘become.’ – To regard an event as an ‘effecting,’ and this as being, that is the 
double error, of interpretation, of which we are guilty. (p. 289)  
To conceive of the mind as a Cartesian thinking thing is to posit something over and above the 
situation in which thinking occurs. Thinking is not something that happens in a mind, as an attribute or 




Johnson (writing with George Lakoff), and Evan Thompson (writing with Francisco 
Varela). 
Organism-environment 
Situated cognition has become an important concept in educational theory, and one 
of the most frequently cited philosophers in this context is John Dewey (see, e.g., 
Bredo, 1994; Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Clancey, 1997; Lave, 1988; Lave & 
Wenger, 1991). Curiously, just as much as Dewey is cited in discussions of situated 
learning, he is almost entirely ignored in the philosophy-of-mind discussion of 
situated cognition.4 But Dewey was clearly the Dennett of his time, at least in terms 
of his enthusiasm for the science of mind and his rejection of Cartesianism. As early 
as 1884 Dewey reviewed the significance of the new physiological psychology, and 
he points to the importance of certain biological concepts of organism and 
environment: 
The influence of biological science in general upon psychology has been very great. . . . To 
biology is due the conception of organism. . . . In psychology this conception has led to the 
recognition of mental life as an organic unitary process developing according to the laws of 
all life, and not a theatre for the exhibition of independent autonomous faculties, or a 
rendezvous in which isolated, atomic sensations and ideas may gather, hold external 
converse, and then forever part. Along with this recognition of the solidarity of mental life 
has come that of the relation in which it stands to other lives organized in society. The idea of 
environment is a necessity to the idea of organism, and with the conception of environment 
comes the impossibility of considering psychical life as an individual, isolated thing 
developing in a vacuum. (Dewey, 1884, p. 280) 
Dewey thus criticized conceptions of cognitive experience that construe it as 
narrowly individual, ideational, and passive. Experience is not something that 
happens in an isolated mind; rather, experience is biological, insofar as it involves an 
organism in an environment, and social, insofar as that environment is 
intersubjective. Cognition, then, emerges in the transactional relations that 
characterize organisms and the physical and social environment with which they 
engage. Experience is thus situated. “In actual experience, there is never any such 
isolated singular object or event; an object or event is always a special part, phase, or 
aspect, of an environing experienced world – a situation” (Dewey, 1938a, p. 67). 
Dewey uses the notion of a problematic situation to describe how cognition 
involves coping with unfamiliar circumstances. Situations are problematic if there is 
some element of confusion, disturbance, uncertainty, or incompleteness that needs to 
be resolved and there is no clear direction that would lead to resolution. In such 
cases, cognition is a form of inquiry, and this is understood as a hands-on practical 
activity through which we transform the situation into one that is less confused and 
more comprehensible, and in which ideas for successful action start to emerge. An 
                                                     
4 One clear exception to this is Johnson (2007), who borrows extensively from Dewey to support his 




idea is not primarily an intellectual entity in the head but “an organic anticipation of 
what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to 
observed conditions” (Dewey, 1938a, p. 109). Cognitive inquiry is not a purely 
mental phenomenon but involves an interaction between organism and environment 
to produce real changes in the causal couplings that characterize the situation. We 
should add the important point that the situation should be defined as inclusive of the 
inquirer.  It is not I as cognitive inquirer confronting a situation; the situation 
surrounds and includes me. 
Dewey was influenced by Peirce in his thinking that, in the process of coping 
with a problematic situation, we use not only ideas but also tools – physical ones like 
hammers with which we can physically reshape the environment, but also linguistic 
ones, which in communicative contexts may do just as well in reshaping the 
dynamics of the situation.5 For Dewey, ideas, as well as gestures and speech acts, are 
themselves tools for this kind of interaction. Furthermore, whether we are moving 
things about or reconstructing meaning, cognition is primarily a social event and is 
often accomplished in a joint effort. Cognition and such communicative processes are 
measurable in terms of their pragmatic success. A good idea consists of a set of 
practices that resolves the problem. 
Dewey was thus criticizing a strict Cartesian division of labor between mind 
and body – a division of labor that was not simply theoretical and a problem for 
philosophers but that was finding its way into the pragmatics of everyday life. 
Consider the following description of management practices from Taylor’s 1911 
textbook Scientific Management: 
Thus all of the planning which under the old system was done by the workman, as a result of 
his personal experience, must of necessity under the new system be done by the management 
in accordance with the laws of the science. . . . It is also clear that in most cases one type of 
man is needed to plan ahead and an entirely different type to execute the work. The man in 
the planning room, whose specialty under scientific management is planning ahead, 
invariably finds that the work can be done better and more economically by a subdivision of 
the labour; each act of each mechanic, for example, should be preceded by various 
preparatory acts done by other men. (Taylor, 1911/1967, p. 37). 
                                                     
5 David Kirsh (2004) summarizes Peirce’s view that “thought is not just expressed in work, it is 
executed in work”:  
C.S Peirce, in his prescient way, was fond of saying that a chemist as much thinks with test 
tube and beaker as with his brain. His insight was that the activity of manipulating tools – in 
Peirce’s case, manipulating representation rich tools and structures such as measuring 
devices, controllable flames, the lines in diagrams, written words – this activity is part of the 
overall process of thought. There is not the inner component, the true locus of thought, and its 
outer expression. The outer activity is a constituent of the thought process, though for Peirce 




The separation of mental experience from hands-on physical manipulation of 
the environment was, for Dewey, both a philosophical and a social problem.6 For 
him, cognition is a form of action and not a relation between a thinking that goes on 
in the mind and a behavior that goes on in the world. The basic unit of experience is 
the organism-environment rather than a Cartesian cogito or Kantian pure ego: 
We see that man is somewhat more than a neatly dovetailed psychical machine who may be 
taken as an isolated individual. . . . We know that his life is bound up with the life of society . 
. . we know that he is closely connected with all the past by the lines of education, tradition, 
and heredity. . . . We know that our mental life is not a syllogistic sorites, but an enthymeme 
most of whose members are suppressed; that large tracts never come into consciousness; that 
those which do get into consciousness, are vague and transitory, with a meaning hard to catch 
and read; . . . that mind is no compartment box nor bureau of departmental powers. (Dewey, 
1884, p. 278) 
Dewey’s concept of cognition is not far removed from what today is called 
“enactive cognition,” which is the idea that perception and thinking are fully 
integrated with motor action. Yet one thing that Dewey clearly emphasizes and that is 
all but missing in some discussions of the enactive approach (e.g., Noë, 2004; Noë & 
O’Regan, 2002; O’Regan & Noë, 2001) is the fact that cognition is always socially 
situated. Throughout Noë’s (2004) analysis of enactive perception, for example, we 
find elements like central nervous systems, sensory organs, skin, muscles, limbs, 
movements, actions, and plenty of physical and pragmatic situations to deal with. But 
there is no consideration given to the role that others (and our social or 
intersubjective interactions with them) play in the shaping of perceptual processes. 
For Noë (2004), “the key to [the enactive theory] is the idea that perception depends 
on the possession and exercise of a certain kind of practical knowledge” (p. 33). The 
mind is “shaped by a complicated hierarchy of practical skills” (p. 31). If we ask, 
How do we get this practical know-how? his answer is embodied practice and action. 
Dewey would not deny this, but he would certainly proffer the idea that we also get it 
from others – watching them act, communicating with them, and learning from them 
through processes like imitation, and indeed from the very start of life when we are 
completely dependent on others.7 What is important in this context is to recognize not 
simply that others populate our environment, or even that we interact with them and 
perceive their intentions, but that such interaction helps to shape our perception and 




6 We cannot help but be reminded of Marx’s thoughts along this same line. He maintains that there is a 
close connection between consciousness, which is a social product, and labor – a connection that is 
ruined in alienated forms of labor (Marx, 1974; Marx & Engels, 1964). 
7 In this regard, the work of Hurley (2006; this volume), who considers the importance of imitation, 
has a closer affinity to Dewey. Thompson and Varela (2001) also emphasize the importance of “cycles 
of intersubjective interaction, involving the recognition of the intentional meaning of actions and 




Being in the World 
Dewey’s pragmatism acknowledges the importance of situation for the biological 
organism, and as such, his position is deep in the traditions of naturalism and 
psychologism.8 These views contend, for example, that the rules of logic are not 
absolute or independent of the biological or psychological makeup of the organism. 
One reaction to the relativism implied in such views is to make the Fregeian move to 
the logic of pure concepts and to understand conceptual meaning and truth to be 
independent of context. Another involves the Husserlian move to a transcendental 
consciousness that is distinct from the particularities of any individual’s 
psychological constitution. Both moves are clearly away from the situatedness of 
experience and constitute a seeming retreat into a Cartesian, if not Platonic, mind. 
Heidegger recognized the ontological limitations of pursuing these lines of thought. 
In his questioning about the nature of the kind of entity that would be capable of such 
decontextualized thinking, he implies that human existence is specifically not that 
kind of entity. He finds an important clue to the nature of human existence and 
cognition in the notion of intentionality as it is developed in the work of Brentano 
and Husserl. Intentionality, the idea that all consciousness is consciousness of 
something or about something, signifies an unavoidable connection with the world. 
For Heidegger (1968), the kind of being that is capable of having an intentional 
relation to the world is a being that is already in the world in a more basic, 
ontological way. This is what he sets out to show in Being and Time, published in 
1927. 
From Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological perspective, claims made by 
Dewey about the organism’s embeddedness in the environment are claims informed 
by common sense (what Husserl called the “natural attitude”) and natural science, 
and are thus made from an objective (external or observational) perspective. 
Heidegger’s project is to dig deeper into a question that still has the ring of a certain 
kind of transcendentalism about it: what kind of existence does the human being have 
such that it is necessarily situated or embedded in the world? His response can be put 
into Dewey’s language:9 the organism does not simply find itself deeply situated in 
an environment as one possibility rather than another. Rather, it is part of the very 
nature of human existence that being in the environment and being with others are 
necessary, existential characteristics. Dewey comes very close to saying precisely 
this: 
The statement that individuals live in a world means, in the concrete, that they live in a series 
of situations. The meaning of the word “in” is different from its meaning when it is said that 
pennies are “in” a pocket or paint is “in” a can. It means . . . that interaction is going on 
between individuals and objects and other persons. The conceptions of situation and of 
interaction are inseparable from each other. (Dewey, 1938b, p. 43) 
                                                     
8 On Dewey’s naturalism, see Santayana (1939). 
9 Notably, in the early 1930s, Dewey expressed interest in Heidegger’s project, “particularly in his 




In Heidegger’s words, Dasein (human existence) is in the world, not in the sense that 
we are simply geographically placed in the environment, but in the sense that a 
meaningful world constitutes part of our existence. To be situated, for Heidegger, is 
not simply something that happens to the human being, but it is part of the being-
structure of being human, and as such permeates every aspect of our cognitive and 
pragmatic activities and our social relations. 
The world, in this sense, is not a collection of objects to be observed or 
contemplated by the mind. Rather, in a primary way, we have our hands in it. The 
world is “at hand” in an almost-literal sense (Heidegger uses the term Zuhandensein 
– being-to-hand). Things are not only available for our manipulation – we find 
ourselves already immersed in such manipulations or dealings, and the possibilities 
of such dealings shape our perceptions and actions. “The kind of dealing which is 
closest to us is . . . not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern 
which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of 
‘knowledge’” (Heidegger, 1968, p. 95). If, for example, I walk into my office, my 
primary relation to this setting is not as a collection of objects – desk, chairs, 
bookcases, computer, and so on, I do not think about the office door – I open it. I do 
not contemplate my desk or chair, I sit, absentmindedly, and start to work, with my 
attention on a problem to solve or a piece of correspondence to write. To use 
Gibson’s term, the affordances offered by door, desk, chair, computer, and so on, are 
implicit in the way that I interact with them – they are ready-to-hand, as Heidegger 
(1968) says: 
The kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this characteristic 
is not to be understood as merely a way of [perceptually or cognitively] taking them, as if we 
were talking such ‘aspects’ into the ‘entities’ which we proximally encounter. (p. 101) 
That is, in the majority of our everyday dealings, we do not first encounter 
objects cognitively, and then decide what they are and what they can be used for. 
Cognition is “a founded mode” of Being-in-the-world that depends on our primary, 
pragmatic interaction with things (Heidegger 1968, p. 86). By the time we think 
about things, or explicitly perceive them as what they are, we have already been 
immersed in their pragmatic meaning. 
To be pragmatically immersed in worldly contexts is to have a certain 
knowing relation to the world, which Heidegger calls “circumspection” (Umsicht) 
and distinguishes from theoretical knowledge. The latter takes things in the world as 
mere objects that we encounter in an observer mode (Heidegger refers to such objects 
as having a Vorhanden [present-to-hand] mode of being): 
“Practical” behaviour is not “atheoretical” in the sense of “sightlessness.” The way it differs 
from theoretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical behaviour one 
observes, while in practical behaviour one acts, and that action must employ theoretical 
cognition if it is not to remain blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just 
as primordial as the fact that action has its own kind of sight. Theoretical behaviour is just 




Heidegger points out that Cartesian philosophy and philosophical conceptions 
of science tend to overlook this basic ontological situatedness of the cognitive 
agent.10 Science begins as something that is already a cognitive, theoretical project. 
Nature “itself can be discovered and defined simply in its pure presence-at-hand. But 
when this happens, the Nature which ‘stirs and strives’, which assails us and enthralls 
us as landscape, remains hidden” (1968, p. 100). Heidegger claims that something 
poetic that is tied to our situatedness is lost in the third-person objective observations 
of science. Of course it is important to point out that even our most theoretical 
contemplations are situated as well, and it is questionable whether it is ever possible 
to capture something in its pure presence-at-hand. Theoretical behavior is never just 
looking without circumspection, even if it is sometimes conceived as such. 
Heidegger’s analysis raises important questions about the very nature of the 
situatedness of cognition as we try to understand it in the varied contexts of 
education, psychiatry, artificial intelligence, and so on. Can situatedness be properly 
characterized in third-person accounts, or does it require an existential analysis of the 
sort provided by Heidegger? In this sort of analysis, we catch sight of what it means 
to be situated in an environment, what readiness-to-hand itself means, primarily 
when readiness-to-hand breaks down – for example, when something we intend to 
use is discovered to be unusable, or when something we need is missing, or when 
something we need to get around stands obstinately in the way. In such cases, things 
are no longer there ready-to-hand, and just in that instance we catch sight of the very 
situatedness that normally characterizes our existence. In such instances, we do not 
escape being situated; rather, the situation simply shifts around us as different things 
become ready-to-hand for purposes of addressing the problem. But in this process the 
situation of always being in a situation announces itself and tells us something not 
simply about the world (or what Heidegger calls the “worldhood of the world”) but 
about our own existence (i.e., that we are always situated, that we are in the world in 
such a radical way that we are never able to step outside of it). One can never get a 
“view from nowhere,” as Nagel (1986) puts it. The situated view (which in other 
terms Heidegger calls the “hermeneutic situation”) is something that qualifies all 
theoretical knowledge and all third-person scientific accounts. Moreover, being 
situated is something that in its inconspicuousness tends to escape our attention, but 
not simply because we overlook it, in the way that we might overlook something in 
the environment. Rather, it is part of what it means to be situated that the fact of 
being situated commonly goes unnoticed. 
This inconspicuousness of being situated leads Heidegger to a number of 
interesting existential observations, for example, the idea that we are thrown into the 
world, that our familiarity and fascination with the world generally leads to our being 
lost to ourselves, a form of inauthenticity. To the extent that being situated 
commonly goes unnoticed, our sense of our own existence is curiously incomplete 
and likely misguided – something that gets cashed out in terms of the problems 
                                                     




encountered by classical cognitive science and strong artificial intelligence (see 
Wheeler, 2005). At the same time, such incompleteness is part of what our existence 
means and is tied to the finitude of our understanding. Heidegger also suggests some 
caution about any philosophy of the world that starts with an understanding of the 
world as a res extensa – Descartes’ notion of an extended, spatial thing – or any 
philosophy of mind that starts with an understanding of the mind as a res cogitans, 
the idea that the mind is a substance or thing that thinks. What the Cartesian ontology 
overlooks is exactly the kind of situatedness that Heidegger describes. For Descartes, 
a thing (whether extended or thinking) is a substance, which, Heidegger explains, is a 
form of being that is present at hand and precisely not that form of being through 
which we are always situated (the ready-to-hand). Indeed, for Descartes, as for 
metaphysics generally and for natural science, the kind of being attributed to things, 
including the entity of the human being, is the kind of being that we access in an 
explicit (third-person) observational attitude and the kind of being that is open to 
analysis by cognition, “intellectio in the sense of the kind of knowledge we get in 
mathematics and physics” (Heidegger, 1968, p. 128). Heidegger’s existential analysis 
is meant to show that human existence is precisely not something present-at-hand, an 
object among other objects, but is in-the-world, that is, always situated in a way that 
the world is primarily ready-to-hand. 
Within our everyday situated projects, we also encounter entities with a being 
that is different from the things that are simply ready-to-hand. These are other 
humans, that is, other entities who are in-the-world in the way that we are in-the-
world. For Heidegger, others appear within the pragmatic contexts that characterize 
our life. Along with the activities that we are engaged in, “We encounter not only 
entities ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein’s kind of Being – entities for 
which, in their concern, the product [e.g., that we may be engaged in producing] 
becomes ready-to-hand” (1968, p. 100). Likely as not, our own activities often 
require others to play some role. I am never an isolated I without others (1968, pp. 
147–163). Moreover, I do not encounter others primarily as those who are in 
opposition to me but as those from whom I do not distinguish myself. That is, in 
regard to other persons, I do not first or in a primary way encounter strangers; rather, 
I find myself already included with others. According to Heidegger, this with is to be 
understood as part of the very structure of human existence. That is, being-in-the- 
world already includes being-with; being situated already involves being situated 
with others.11 
Heidegger also presents an analysis of spatiality that is tied to our situated 
condition. Space is objective only derivatively; it is first of all related to the kinds of 
activities in which we are engaged. Thus, “a pathway which is long ‘Objectively’ can 
                                                     
11 Heidegger points out that this is the case even if one is alone. The claim that our existence is 
characterized as being-with “must be understood as an existential statement as to its essence. Even if 
the particular factical Dasein does not turn to Others, and supposes that it has no need of them or 




be much shorter than one which is ‘Objectively’ shorter still but which is perhaps 
‘hard going’ and comes before us as interminably long” (1968, p. 141). Far and close 
are determined by our pragmatic relations. Five miles is a long distance to go to buy 
a newspaper but not so long if you intend to purchase a new home. Far and close also 
become metaphors that inform our evaluation of situations. I may feel closer to a 
person who lives a thousand miles away than to the person standing next to me 
(1968, p. 141). 
Heidegger’s discussion of embodiment is minimal and is found mostly in the 
context of his analysis of spatiality. Closeness, he maintains, is not definable as an 
objective distance from one’s body. Even the “here” is not defined in terms of bodily 
location, but relative to a “there” that is defined pragmatically. How do I reach the 
thing that is there; how do I move myself over there? Only in relation to such 
concerns do I start to consider my “here.” In this sense, in my situation, I am always 
“there,” or at least directed to the “there,” and in that light my “here” is defined as 
too far (from the “there” where I need to be), or too awkwardly positioned, and so on. 
Heidegger even suggests that right and left emerge in such pragmatic relations, and 
that our spatialization “in its ‘bodily nature’ is likewise marked out in accordance 
with these directions” (1968, p. 143). According to Heidegger, however, our 
embodied sense of right and left play no role in these determinations. 
Heidegger’s accounts of both intersubjectivity and spatiality remain closely 
tied to his analysis of the pragmatic or instrumental situation. Our encounters with 
others are always situated in pragmatic contexts – he often uses the example of work-
related projects. As such, we encounter others not directly but across our dealings 
with things. Others “show themselves in the world in their special environmental 
Being, and do so in terms of what is ready-to-hand in that world” (1968, p. 160). That 
is, others appear as engaged in pragmatic contexts similar to (or different from) our 
own. This analysis leaves little room for more direct and personal relations such as 
those based on emotional or even biological attraction. Without doubt, such personal 
relations may also be situated in instrumental contexts, but it is also possible to find 
such relations in what are closer to purely social or communicative contexts. 
Likewise, spatiality is cast in purely instrumental terms with little role for embodied 
processes. Heidegger does not deny that our existence is embodied, but he does not 
say very much about it. 
Embodiment and Beyond 
Merleau-Ponty, working in the same phenomenological tradition, takes both 
embodiment and intersubjectivity as more central to the way that experience works. 
His anti-Cartesian view of the active body derives from his study of Bergson and 
what were Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts (especially Husserl, 1952). Husserl 
had outlined a concept of embodiment that distinguished Descartes’ concept of the 
objective body (the body as an object extended in space, or as studied by biological 




which I act. It is the lived body that gears into the affordances of the world, and that, 
according to Husserl, is lived as an “I can.” I approach the world with all of the 
possibilities for movement and action that are of my body. I experience the world in 
an egocentric spatial framework that is determined by my body. In this regard, “my 
body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task. 
And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of external objects or like that of ‘spatial 
sensations’, a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. 100). 
Bergson, too, had provided a rich concept of embodied cognition. In Matter 
and Memory (1911), he understands memory to accumulate in the body as a set of 
responses to a complex set of solicitations from the world. The body retains 
[…] from the past only the intelligently co-ordinated movements which represent the 
accumulated efforts of the past; and it recovers those past efforts, not in the memory-images 
which recall them, but in the definite order and systematic character with which the actual 
movements take place. In truth, it no longer represents our pasts to us, it acts it; and if it still 
deserves the name memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it 
prolongs their useful effect into the present moment. (Bergson, 1911, p. 93) 
Merleau-Ponty supplements these philosophical sources with his own study 
of psychology and neurology. He borrows the concept of body schema from Head 
and Holmes (1911–1912). Consistent with Bergson’s concept of embodied memory, 
Head’s (1920) body schema dynamically organizes sensorimotor feedback in such a 
way that the final sensation of position is “charged with a relation to something that 
has happened before” (p. 606). Head uses the metaphor of a taximeter, which 
computes and registers movement as it goes. Merleau-Ponty relates this metaphor to 
Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness, which shows that we should think of 
experience not as momentary but as a temporally extended yet cohesive flow 
structured to enable retentions (of the just past) and protentions (of the just about to 
be). For Merleau-Ponty (1968), action is also temporally extended and organized 
according to the “time of the body, taximeter time of the corporeal schema” (p. 173). 
And this includes a retentional component, as well as anticipatory aspects: “At each 
successive instant of a movement, the preceding instant is not lost sight of. It is, as it 
were, dovetailed into the present. . . . [Movement draws] together, on the basis of 
one’s present position, the succession of previous positions, which envelop each 
other” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 140). 
This temporality is essential to the structure of our situated experiences and 
actions. We are situated not only spatially but also in time, and more generally in 
history. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the experience of meaning or our ability 
to make sense of things within the space of the environment is only possible if our 
experience is structured in this temporal (retentional-protentional) way. Imagine if 
every experience we had completely fell away into a past that remained inaccessible 
to us. If our perception or thought were a strictly synchronic experience, there could 
be no meaningful structure to it; it would lack context and connection with anything 




problem is solved on a purely physiological or purely psychological level. That is, as 
Bergson had shown, the temporality of experience that is a necessary condition for us 
to be in a situation is not explainable as a physical trace within an objective body or 
brain, as such traces would be purely present and not sufficient to explain the past. 
But, Merleau-Ponty suggests, for the same reason neither is some unconscious or 
psychical trace sufficient. A present representation of the past or any present content 
of consciousness remains present; it cannot explain why we might take it as 
representing the past. Rather, he proposes that we have a direct but incompletely 
constituted “contact with the past in its own domain” (1962, p. 413), but not in the 
form of an object of knowledge. Temporality is in some way a “dimension of our 
being” (p. 415). More specifically, it is a dimension of our situated existence. 
Merleau-Ponty explains this along the lines of the Heideggerian analysis of being-in- 
the-world. It is in my everyday dealings with things that the horizon of the day gets 
defined: it is in “this moment I spend working, with, behind it, the horizon of the day 
that has elapsed, and in front of it, the evening and night – that I make contact with 
time, and learn to know its course” (pp. 415–416). It is not that I represent the day as 
measurable by the clock; 
I do not form a mental picture of my day, it weighs upon me with all its weight, it is still 
there, and though I may not recall any detail of it, I have the impending power to do so, I still 
‘have it in hand.’ . . . Our future is not made up exclusively of guesswork and daydreams. 
Ahead of what I see and perceive . . . my world is carried forward by lines of intentionality 
which trace out in advance at least the style of what is to come. (1962, p. 416) 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty suggests, I feel time on my shoulders and in my fatigued 
muscles; I get physically tired from my work; I see how much more I have to do. 
Time is measured out first of all in my embodied actions as I “reckon with an 
environment” in which “I seek support in my tools, and am at my task rather than 
confronting it” (p. 416). Accordingly, my sense of time emerges out of my situated 
actions: “What, in fact, do we mean when we say that there is no world without a 
being in the world? Not indeed that the world is constituted by consciousness, but on 
the contrary that consciousness always finds itself already at work in the world” (p. 
432). 
What finds itself already at work in the world is not the Cartesian cogito, 
which, Merleau-Ponty suggests, thought has to strain to discover. Rather, “my body, 
in a familiar surrounding, finds its orientation and makes its way among objects 
without my needing to have them expressly in mind” (1962, p. 369). It is not a matter 
of an “I” standing back as an observer of the things around me; “rather it is that my 
consciousness takes flight from itself and, in them, is unaware of itself” (p. 369), and 
it does this in perception as in action. Merleau-Ponty means that there is no explicit 
or conceptual or reflective awareness of myself, or of my body, when I am engaged 
in my everyday projects. It is not that, as if by some inner power, I conceive of a 
space through which I need to guide my hand as it reaches to grasp something; the 
shape of my grasp is not a representation of the object that I intend to grasp. How 




already situated on a path” of action (p. 370)? The situation, then, is not laid out 
before me, as an object of consciousness; it is a tergo – I am in it and it is affecting 
me before I know it. Merleau-Ponty brings this affectivity into focus as an important 
component of situated cognition in a way that the theorists of enactive perception 
sometimes lose sight of. 
In agreement with such theorists, Merleau-Ponty would say that vision or, 
more generally, perception is a form of action (1962, p. 377).12 Merleau-Ponty, 
however, would balance this claim with the idea that the world, the situation we find 
ourselves in, also shapes our vision, and there is an element of passivity, or more 
properly affectivity, that is built into our way of being in the world. Moreover, this is 
not simply the case for perception but extends to the full cognitive-emotional-
linguistic life of an individual and can easily have a normative significance: 
Children and many grown people are under the sway of ‘situational values’, which conceal 
from them their actual feelings – they are pleased because they have been given a present, sad 
because they are at a funeral, gay or sad according to the countryside around them, and, on 
the hither side of any such emotions, indifferent and neutral. . . . Our natural attitude is not to 
experience our own feelings or to adhere to our own pleasures, but to live in accordance with 
the emotional categories of the environment. (1962, pp. 379–380) 
This kind of affectivity is obviously involved in intersubjectivity, which 
Merleau-Ponty analyzes in terms of what he calls “intercorporeality.” Although 
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the kind of analysis that Heidegger provided (i.e., that 
we encounter others across the various instrumental contexts involved in everyday 
life; see Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 347–348), this is not a sufficient account because 
it does not answer precisely how we come to recognize them, in the first place, as 
other persons rather than as, for example, other, albeit peculiar, instruments, or how 
we escape a kind of philosophical autism. Rather, one needs to understand this 
problem in terms of embodiment and to recognize that “the very first of all cultural 
objects, and the one by which all the rest exist, is the body of the other person as the 
vehicle of a form of behavior” (1962, p. 348). My access to the other is not by way of 
inference or analogy, using the other’s body as a means to project myself into his or 
her mind. Rather, there is a direct interrelation between my body and the other’s body 
                                                     
12 See Noë (2004, pp. 1, 73), who cites Merleau-Ponty in this context: “You aren’t given the visual 
world all at once. You are in the world, and through skillful visual probing – what Merleau-Ponty 
called ‘palpatation with the eyes’ – you bring yourself into contact with it. . . . Like touch, vision is 
active” (Noë, 2004, p. 73). The idea of enactive perception recently put forward by Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch (1991), Hurley (1999), O’Regan and Noë (2001), and others, often with references to 
Merleau-Ponty, has been discussed at least since the end of the nineteenth century. Noë could just as 
easily have cited Dewey’s statement from his 1896 essay “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”:  
not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensori-motor coordination . . . it is the movement 
which is primary, and the sensation which is secondary, the movement of body, head and eye 
muscles determining the quality of what is experienced. . . . [In audition] the sound is not a 
mere stimulus, or mere sensation; it again is an act. . . . It is just as true to say that the 
sensation of sound arises from a motor response as that the running away is a response to the 




at the level of perception (see Gallagher, 2001, 2005, chap. 9). Merleau-Ponty 
suggests what developmental psychology has only recently shown; namely, even 
young infants are capable of perceiving the intentions of others (1962, p. 352; see, 
e.g., Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001; Meltzoff, 
1995). But, more than this, there is a direct resonance between my bodily behavior 
and the bodily behavior of the other. 
This concept of intercorporeality finds good support in recent research on 
mirror neurons and neuronal resonance systems (e.g., Decety & Sommerville, 2003; 
Jeannerod, 2001; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Matelli, et al., 1996), although these phenomena would not have led Merleau-Ponty 
in the direction of simulation theory, as we find in many authors (e.g., Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004). If by simulation one means the use of 
a model to understand something that cannot be understood directly (e.g., the other’s 
mind), a routine in which I manipulate a set of first-person as-if intentions – and this 
is the concept of simulation as it is defined by simulation theory – then this is clearly 
not what is going on in the activation of mirror neurons. The activation of resonance 
systems is automatic and subpersonal; that is, it is not I who do it but rather a process 
in the perceiver’s brain that is elicited by the perception of the other’s action. It is not 
something the subject decides to do, or does actively, and therefore it is not a 
simulation in that sense. If activation of the mirror system looks like a first-person 
pretense, it does so only to an external observer, not to the subject or system itself. 
Neurons do not fire as if they were generating action; they just fire.13 If 
intercorporeality is about action, it is not entirely about my action in response to 
others but must include the effect that the other’s action has on my system. It is not 
that I simulate the action of the other; it is rather that the other’s action elicits the 
resonant responses in my system. In this affectivity we find ourselves pulled into a 
situation that is already intersubjective. Just as Merleau-Ponty (1962) suggests that 
“the theory of the body is already a theory of perception” (p. 203), we could suggest 
that the theory of the body is already a theory of intersubjectivity. 
A similar affectivity can be found in language, which in some sense may be a 
tool that we use for communicative action with others – “I learn [language] as I learn 
to use a tool, by seeing it used in the context of a certain situation” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. 403) – but in another sense is not something that we totally control in our 
speech acts; rather, it is something that contributes to the constitution of the situation 
in which we find ourselves immersed. Thus,  
language takes on a meaning for the child when it establishes a situation for him. . . . The 
power possessed by language of bringing the thing expressed into existence, of opening up to 
thought new ways, new dimensions and new landscapes, is, in the last analysis, as obscure for 
the adult as for the child. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 401)  
                                                     
13 See Gallagher (2007) for a critique of implicit simulation theory. I thank Philip Robbins for alerting 
me to an article by Goldman and Sripada (2005). They define a minimal sense of simulation that does 
not involve subjective control or the generation of pretend states. How a minimal concept of 




For Merleau-Ponty, language has this effect on us; in the speech act, the subject does 
not first represent the words to him- or herself; the subject “plunges into speech,” and 
in so doing “reveals a motor presence of the word which is not the knowledge of the 
word” (1962, p. 403). My speech involves both my action and a passive affectivity: it 
is “a certain use made of my phonatory equipment, a certain modulation of my body 
as a being in the world” (1962, p. 403) that is simultaneously and ambiguously my 
action and something that language does to me. 
Language in the Context of Everyday Life 
It is also the case that language use is a socially constrained practice. According to 
Wittgenstein (1953), our use of language is similar to playing a game that has a 
particular set of rules. Each use of language, however, involves a different language 
game, where the various games are run according to different sets of rules, and there 
are no universal rules. The games are played, we might say, in the world, and 
linguistic meaning is determined by the circumstances in which any particular game 
is played. On this view, a private language – a language spoken by a person who 
somehow grasps a conceptual truth about the world and then simply expresses that 
truth in words that receive their meaning from what goes on in his or her isolated 
mind – is not intelligible to, or learnable by, anyone other than the speaker, because a 
language consists of a communicative system that exists only between agents who 
are in social interaction. Linguistic meaning is generated in that kind of 
contextualized communication:  
Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. . 
. . When we look at the simple forms of language the mental mist which seems to enshroud 
our ordinary use of language disappears. We see activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and 
transparent. (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 17) 
Language is grounded on acting in particular contexts, and in the immediate reactions 
we have to others. The meanings of words are not the products of the linguistic 
system nor derived from a one-to-one correspondence to items in the world; rather, 
they are generated in the activities in which they are used. In this sense the use of a 
term does not presuppose having a concept stored in one’s head. Rather, language is 
generated in the experience of the various contexts, practices, and activities that 
generate meaning. I do not think first in abstraction and then put a word to the 
concept (see, e.g., Gauker, 2003, 2005; Travis, 1989). There are no abstract 
principles or universal rules that would allow me to do that. I am first involved in 
some project in a specific setting – for example, a science lab, an operating room, an 
airport – and in a specific kind of discourse or conceptual practice that others share 
just in such settings, in the same way that they share certain instruments and 
technologies. 
Wittgenstein is thus committed to some form of externalism, the idea that the 
meaning of a word or statement depends on the linguistic community in which the 




discussion, see Overgaard, 2004). To know what something means is not equivalent 
to simply being in a certain psychological state (Putnam, 1975). Following a rule in a 
language game does not involve a metacognitive interpretation of a rule that we 
somehow hold in our head. It is rather an ability that consists in nothing more or less 
than a practice, the mastery of which has been fined tuned in particular settings 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, § 201). If the notion of situated cognition emphasizes the 
contextual dimensions of such practices, where the meaning of a concept, and the 
significance of verbal and gestural actions are inseparable from the setting of action, 
or from a form of life, then Wittgenstein is clearly describing situated cognition. In a 
well-defined situation, a practice can be well defined not by the existence of a rule 
book that is consulted, or by an explicit understanding of the rules, but by the 
physical and socially defined situation itself. The meaning of a concept is not fixed or 
universal, as it is dependent on its use in specific contexts, which are subject to 
temporal and historical change. What determines our concepts, Wittgenstein asserts, 
is “the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any 
action” (1967, § 567). 
Wittgenstein (1953, §§ 2-21) describes the practices of a builder and his 
assistant cooperating on a project in which meanings are created by ostensive 
reference precisely because the context is narrowly circumscribed so as to define a 
shared communicative situation. The tasks that compose this project are context 
specific and require skills that are not only about material construction but also about 
conceptual construction. A language and a set of concepts are created by the 
particular purposes involved in the situation. The vocabulary involved in this context 
consists of four words – block, pillar, slab, beam – names of the four items that the 
builders use to build. Grammatically, the utterance of one word is, in this context, a 
sentence. Moreover, when the builder utters the word slab, something gets 
accomplished – the assistant passes on a slab. Thus, in contrast to traditional 
approaches that make concept use a matter of detached and deliberative judgment, 
Wittgenstein maintains that concept use is more like a practical skill. 
Proponents of situated cognition have argued both for and against the idea 
that this kind of skill is nonrepresentational, an issue that is taken up in other chapters 
of this volume.14 Here it may be helpful to mention how Wittgenstein fits into this 
debate. A radical situationist can argue that because we are already in the world, we 
do not need to replicate the world in our head; an internal representation would be no 
better than the access we have to the world itself (see, e.g., Noë, 2004, p. 219). That 
is, we do not need a representation of the world if, in fact, the world is there for our 
having. When the builder says “slab,” the assistant does not need to form a mental 
                                                     
14 See chapters in this volume by Adams and Aizawa, Clark, Eliasmith, Millikan, and Rowlands. See 
also Anderson (2003); Brooks (1999); Clancey (1997); Hutto (in press); Kirsh (2004); Noë (2004), 
Rowlands (2007), and the special issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (vol. 1, no. 4, 




image of a slab; the slab is perceptually and handily available.15 His concept of slab – 
its meaning – is equivalent to what he can do with it. At the very least we can say that 
a representation in the form of a mental image is not necessary for the successful use 
of language. Rowlands (2007), however, argues that the Wittgensteinian appeal to 
practice, understood as a form of intentional action, is not sufficient to rid cognitive 
systems of representations. 
Wittgenstein, famously, developed a paradox concerning the possibility of 
rule following. Many commentators have thought that the key to solving this paradox 
lies in Wittgenstein’s (1953) appeal to practice: “And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a 
practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not 
possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would 
be the same thing as obeying” (§202; see also Rowlands, 2007) 
That is, in our ordinary practice in everyday contexts, we do not explicitly 
consult a set of rules to guide our practice; indeed, consulting the rules would itself 
be a practice different from the worldly practice that we are trying to guide. But 
Rowlands argues that the appeal to practice cannot explain away representations 
because, at least in the traditional view, practice involves intentional action, and this 
presupposes some form of representational content. “A practice is what we do. 
However, doing, it seems, is a form of acting and, as such, is essentially connected to 
intentional states. But intentional states are individuated by their content. . . . And 
content arises through representation” (Rowlands, 2007). To defeat 
representationalism once and for all, Rowlands argues, one needs a different concept 
of action than the one Wittgenstein was working with.16 
It is not clear, however, that Wittgenstein was working with one concept of 
action or one concept of representation. It would seem to be a Wittgensteinian 
principle that there is no one correct answer to the question of whether a 
representational concept of skill, or action, or mind is better than a 
nonrepresentational one. In the cognitive sciences, for example, there are in fact 
many different meanings to the term representation (sometimes the term is used in 
discussing mental images, sometimes in discussing reference, and other times in 
describing neuronal firing patterns), and whether we are willing to accept the 
implications carried by the term may depend on the particular theoretical context in 
which it is used. Likewise, in regard to the question of everyday practice, it may be 
the case that some practices are representational and some are not, depending on how 
the term might be descriptive of the different pragmatic contexts. The argument 
between representationalists and nonrepresentationalists, the Wittgensteinian might 
suggest, is complicated by the use of multiple language games that differ from one 
discourse to another, from phenomenology and philosophy to psychology and the 
                                                     
15 This may run against situated approaches to language comprehension and concept use that 
emphasize the role of simulation. For discussion, see chapters in this volume by Zwaan and Kaschak, 
and by Barsalou. 




cognitive neurosciences. The term representation does not have a meaning outside of 
its particular uses in these different language games. Is it better to use the word 
representation than to not use it? Better for what? Assuming that in certain contexts 
we agree on the concepts of intentional state and intentional content, Rowlands’s 
insistence on the notion of representation may be correct for those contexts. 
This brings us to the possibility that theories of situated cognition are 
themselves differently situated, within different disciplines or discourses, shaped by 
specific debates and specialized vocabularies. In any case, it is generally understood 
that Wittgenstein offers significant resources in support of the notion of situated 
cognition and against both Cartesian dualist metaphysics and the more recent 
computationalist views.17 For Wittgenstein, cognition cannot be reduced to 
propositional knowledge tightly organized in a well-formed mind; cognition is really 
a collection of skills and practices that rely on commonsense know-how and context-
specific knowledge. The contexts of cognitive practices are also always social, so that 
what we call our beliefs have meaning only in virtue of their role in the social 
contexts in which we participate (see, e.g., Brandom, 1994). 
Conclusion 
Dewey, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein provide continuing resources 
for approaches to cognition that recognize its situated nature. I have suggested that 
these thinkers are not just part of the historical background, but that we can learn by 
thinking further about their contributions. They remind us that cognition is not only 
pragmatically situated but also always socially situated, not simply in the sense that 
the world is populated with others with whom we communicate but also in the sense 
that this communication and interaction shape our cognitive abilities from the very 
beginning. They push us to realize that cognition not only is enactive but also elicited 
by our physical and social environment; that it not only involves a deeply embodied 
and temporally structured action but also is formed in an affective resonance 
generated by our surroundings and by others with whom we interact. These thinkers 
also challenge us to consider what it means to think of cognition as situated, what it 
means to do a science of situated cognition, and what it means if we end up with 
more than one conception of what situated cognition means. 
 
                                                     
17 Even if some philosophers still think that Turing wins out over Wittgenstein, current theorists of 
artificial intelligence and robotics are not so sure. Dennett (2003, p. 3) writes: “What Turing saw, and 
Wittgenstein did not, was the importance of the fact that a computer doesn’t need to understand rules 
to follow them. Who “won”? Turing comes off as somewhat flatfooted and naive, but he left us the 
computer, while Wittgenstein left us . . . Wittgenstein.” Rodney Brooks (1999), in his work on 
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